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“I know that this program has saved lives.  I know we’ve disrupted 
plots.  I know this program alone is worth more than the FBI, the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency put 
together, have been able to tell us.” 
George Tenet, former CIA Director,                                                   
on the CIA’s interrogation techniques1
“I don’t care what George Tenet says.  I know what’s right.  I 
know what’s morally right as far as America’s behavior . . . .  
We’ve gotten a huge amount of misinformation as well as other 
information from these techniques.” 
 Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.)2
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Miranda warnings are familiar to almost all Americans who have 
watched television or seen a movie at any time since the Supreme Court 
decided Miranda v. Arizona.3  The rules have evolved over the years, 
and difficult issues of proof may arise, but litigants, attorneys, and 
judges fundamentally know how Miranda works.  Suspects have the 
right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present for questioning, 
and the right to have an attorney appointed to represent them if they 
cannot afford one.4  Nevertheless, few areas of law provoke more 
consistent debate than interrogation and confessions, and Miranda’s 
exclusion of incriminating statements in some criminal cases has only 
added to the controversy.5  Moreover, the war on terror has complicated 
the issues and raised the stakes.6
 1. 60 Minutes: At the Center of the Storm (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29, 
2007). 
 2. Katherine Shrader, Tenet Memoir Draws Heat from Key Players, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS NEWSWIRES, Apr. 30, 2007. 
 3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 4. If a suspect is interrogated while in custody, the officer has to inform the 
suspect of his or her rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present for 
questioning, and the suspect must waive those rights or statements made by the suspect 
will be inadmissible at trial.  Id. at 444. 
 5. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 291 (2d ed. 
1992). 
 6. “[C]laims of violations of human-rights law or the Constitution must be 
evaluated in the context of the realities created by Sept. 11.”  John C. Yoo, Perspectives 
on the Rules of War: Sept. 11 Has Changed the Rules, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 2004, at 
B9, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/06/15/EDGKJ766AM1. 
DTL. 
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When discussing terrorism, the situation most often presented is the 
“ticking bomb” scenario.  This is the hypothetical situation in which 
the authorities want to interrogate a suspect in custody regarding his 
knowledge about a bomb that has been set to explode or a planned 
terrorist attack.7  Is this suspect entitled not to incriminate himself?  What 
about the presence of an attorney or the right to remain silent?8  In fact, 
are the interrogators permitted to force the suspect, even to the point of 
torture, to get an answer?  We normally condemn forceful tactics, but 
with numerous lives on the line, “the issue of torture gets complicated 
and the easy pieties don’t so easily apply.”9  Commentator Charles 
Krauthammer addressed the torture issue as follows: 
 Question: If you have the slightest belief that hanging this man by his 
thumbs will get you the information to save a million people, are you permitted 
to do it? 
 Now, on most issues regarding torture, I confess tentativeness and 
uncertainty.  But on this issue, there can be no uncertainty: Not only is it 
permissible to hang this miscreant by his thumbs.  It is a moral duty.10
In reality, of course, the more likely scenario is one in which several 
suspects are in custody, and one or more of them may have knowledge 
relevant to a planned terrorist attack but many others will have no such 
knowledge.11  What rights are to be accorded the suspects in that 
situation? 
 7. See George J. Terwillinger, III, “Domestic Unlawful Combatants”: A Proposal 
to Adjudicate Constitutional Detentions, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55, 55 (setting forth a 
similar scenario). 
 8. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 152 (2006) (“The Fifth Amendment’s right to remain silent . . . applies only in 
the criminal justice system.”).  Yoo details the problems of providing similar rights to 
terrorist suspects.  Id. at 152–53. 
 9. Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 5, 2005, 
at 21, 22, available at http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/ 
400rhqav.asp. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Krauthammer addresses this point as follows: 
Sure, the (nuclear) scale is hypothetical, but in the age of the car-and suicide-
bomber, terrorists are often captured who have just set a car bomb to go off or 
sent a suicide bomber out to a coffee shop, and you only have minutes to find 
out where the attack is to take place . . . . 
  And even if the example I gave were entirely hypothetical, the 
conclusion—yes, in this case even torture is permissible—is telling because it 
establishes the principle: Torture is not always impermissible.  However rare 
the cases, there are circumstances in which, by any rational moral calculus, 
torture not only would be permissible but would be required (to acquire life-
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To adequately address this issue, we must resolve certain other 
questions, including: Do standard criminal procedure laws apply?  
Where are the suspects being held—in or outside of the United 
States?  What is their citizenship status?  Do they qualify as prisoners 
of war?12  How urgent is the supposed threat?  How reliable is the 
information known by the authorities?  Can torture ever be justified, 
and how is it defined?13  What about psychological pressure?  What is 
the consequence of violating the rights of the detainee/prisoner?  
What international obligations apply?14
saving information).  And once you’ve established the principle, to paraphrase 
George Bernard Shaw, all that’s left to haggle about is the price.  In the case of 
torture, that means that the argument is not whether torture is ever permissible, 
but when—i.e., under what obviously stringent circumstances: how big, how 
imminent, how preventable the ticking time bomb. 
Id. 
 12. Torture is illegal, regardless of whether or not a particular captive qualifies as a 
“prisoner of war” under the Geneva Conventions, but coercive interrogation methods are 
not necessarily “torture.”  The law leaves substantial room for the use of these tactics by 
both the military and the CIA.  David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The McCain 
Amendment Is Flawed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2005, at A11 (arguing that by equating 
stressful interrogations with torture critics have “wrongly painted the Bush administration’s 
policies as illegal”). 
 13. In the press and in academic discussions it is common to distinguish between 
“torture,” in which physical assaults on the body of the victim result in excruciating pain, 
and the category of “torture lite” or “stress and duress” techniques, which include 
depriving subjects of food, sleep, light, or water, subjecting them to loud noises or bright 
lights, shackling them in painful positions, and depriving them of medical attention.  
Seth F. Kreimer, “Torture Lite,” “Full Bodied” Torture, and the Insulation of Legal 
Conscience, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 187, 188 n.3 (2005).  The leading 
international judicial decision relates to Britain’s use of five stress methods against the IRA, 
including “wall standing,” hooding, sleep deprivation, reduced rations, and constant loud 
noise.  The court found that this was not torture, but did constitute cruel and inhuman 
treatment when used in combination.  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at 26–27 (1978). 
The infamous Bybee Memo of August 1, 2002, defined physical torture as the 
infliction of “excruciating and agonizing physical . . . pain” that is “equivalent to the pain 
that would be associated with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, 
or permanent damage resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely result.”  
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel 
to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–
2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 2002 OLC LEXIS 19.  This definition was repudiated in a 
memorandum of December 30, 2004.  Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant 
Att’y Gen., to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
 14. See James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The 
Impact of Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations on 
State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
997 (1998); Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional 
Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003). 
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Many of these questions go beyond the scope of this Article, but the 
rights of terrorist suspects and the potential applicability of Miranda is 
much more than a hypothetical question. Governmental sources, academic 
commentators, and the media have all recently devoted a great deal of 
attention to these subjects.15
An American citizen arrested within the United States would certainly 
have the right not to incriminate himself.  A foreign national arrested outside 
of the U.S. would presumably not be protected.16  Other scenarios present 
more difficult issues.17  American courts, therefore, have to determine 
whether the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination applies 
to non-American citizens, and whether an American police or military 
agent conducting an investigation abroad must provide some type of 
warnings before conducting an interrogation.18  The initial question 
would seem to be whether terrorist suspects are even entitled to the right 
protected by Miranda—the right not to incriminate themselves. 
 15. See Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A 
Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal For a New Miranda 
Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002);  M. K. B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and 
Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 319 (2003); 
Robert L. Bartley, A ‘Miranda’ Warning for Saddam?, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2003, at A11, 
available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/rbartley/?id=110003743; Andrew 
C. McCarthy, McCain & Miranda: “Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading” May Prove More 
Dangerous than Meets the Eye, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Dec. 15, 2005, http://search. 
nationalreview.com/ (search using search term “Prove More Dangerous,” follow “McCain & 
Miranda” hyperlink). 
 16. But see United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 270–71 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (holding that FBI agents sent to Afghanistan to interrogate captured members of 
the al Qaeda network had to abide by constitutional limitations, saying: “The Supreme 
Court cases on point suggest that the Fourth Amendment applies to United States 
citizens abroad . . . .  Thus, this Court finds that even though the searches at issue in this 
case occurred in Kenya, El-Hage can bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.”).  As the 
United States continues to fight the war against terrorism and seek out terrorist activity 
located outside of this nation, interrogations of non-American citizens by American 
officials will undoubtedly increase both in number and importance. 
 17. The Bin Laden court said, “The Government seems to concede the general 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to American citizens abroad . . . .”  Id. at 270. 
 18. Complicating these questions is the fact that the laws of many foreign nations 
do not provide suspects with the full range of rights embodied in Miranda, such as the 
right to remain silent or the right to speak to an attorney.  Thus, informing a foreign 
national of these rights might actually mislead the suspect, at least as to any prosecution 
that might take place in that nation, as opposed to the United States.  Godsey, supra note 
15, at 1708. 
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II.  THE LAW OF SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The history of the privilege against self-incrimination in Great Britain 
extends back more than 400 years,19 and scholars have long debated both 
its merits and its defects.20  In the days of the Star Chamber, procedures 
such as the rack and other instruments of torture were often used to 
obtain confessions.21  The practice of using harsh tactics to compel an 
accused to speak against himself gradually became such a problem that 
courts ultimately prohibited all parties, including criminal defendants, 
from testifying as witnesses at their trials.22 
 19. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 42–43 (3d ed. 1963) (describing 1568 Court of Common Pleas’ release 
of defendant imprisoned for not answering judge’s questions). 
 20. See, e.g., id. at 48–57 (summarizing criticism of privilege by Jeremy 
Bentham); 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 229–41 (photo. 
reprint 1978) (1827) (criticizing exclusion of self-incriminating evidence because the 
innocent would want to speak, and therefore the privilege would only protect the guilty); 
Ian Dennis, Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reassessing 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 342, 342–53 (1995) 
(concluding that the system should apply the privilege in limited contexts and not view it 
as a human right); David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1986) (describing the privilege as a 
historical relic). 
 21. See WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 38–40 (describing development of privilege 
over hundreds of years).  Some historians date the beginning of the concept of a privilege 
to 1637, with the trial of John Lilburn, a Star Chamber case.  The Trial of John Lilburn 
and John Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1637); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
459 (1966) (identifying Lilburn as a critical historical event in development of privilege).  
Parliament abolished the Star Chamber after this trial.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 459  
(noting the Star Chamber’s fall following the Lilburn trial).  Other scholars trace the 
privilege even further back in time.  See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 244 n.2 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (noting the view that the 
privilege dates back to canon law); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458 n.27 (noting that some 
commentators find analogous principles in the Bible). 
 22. Scott Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IOWA L. REV. 482, 485–90 
(1939).  See WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 43 (describing procedures regarding defendant 
as witness in 1700s).  As for torture creating a “problem,” consider: 
Torture is not always to be trusted, nor is it always to be disbelieved: it is a 
delicate, dangerous and deceptive thing.  For many persons have such strength 
of body and soul that they heed pain very little, so that there is no means of 
obtaining the truth from them; while others are so susceptible to pain that they 
will tell any lie rather than suffer it. 
James Ross, A History of Torture, in TORTURE 3, 6 (Kenneth Roth & Minky Worden 
eds., 2005) (quoting THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, bk. 48, ch. 18, § 1).   
Those wretched women, whose minds have already been disturbed by the 
delusions and arts of the devil and are now upset by frequent torture, . . . and 
constantly dragged out to undergo atrocious torment until they would gladly 
exchange at any moment this most bitter existence for death, are willing to 
confess whatever crimes are suggested to them rather than be thrust back into 
their hideous dungeon among recurring torture. 
Id. at 11–12 (quoting 2 HENRY CHARLES LEA, MATERIALS TOWARD A HISTORY OF 
WITCHCRAFT 524–25 (Arthur C. Howland ed., Thomas Yoseloff 1957) (1939)). 
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A complete ban on all testimony from parties was eventually recognized 
as an obstacle in the pursuit of truth, and the prohibition was lifted.23  
Criminal defendants were permitted to testify, but they also had the right 
not to testify.24  Judges, however, could comment on a defendant’s 
failure to testify.25
Following English common law, early American courts permitted the 
introduction of confessions without restriction, even if law enforcement 
officials had abridged the rights of those being interrogated.26  The key issue 
 23. The House of Commons passed the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898.  See 
WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 45–48 (noting that the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 was 
developed to counteract unmerited acquittals resulting from defendants not testifying); 
see also Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36 (Eng.) (changing rules 
regarding competency of witnesses). 
 24. See Criminal Evidence Act § 1(a) (stating that the charged person “shall be a 
competent witness,” but “shall [only] be called . . . upon his own application”). 
 25. See WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 59–63.  In addition, once a defendant elected 
to testify, the Act compelled him to answer incriminating questions.  Id. 
 26. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 294.  Of course, torture was prohibited by 
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 
(1976) (“[T]he primary concern of the drafters was to proscribe ‘torture[s]’ and other 
‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) 
(tracing the ban on cruel and unusual punishment to the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 
which prohibited punishments “unauthorized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court”).  This, however, applies only to actions that constitute “punishment.”  
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1998).  See generally 
Ronald J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the 
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299 (1990). 
The Lieber Code, drafted by German-American political philosopher Francis Lieber 
for Abraham Lincoln, was promulgated to the Union forces on April 24, 1863.  It 
provides, inter alia: 
Article 16: Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction 
of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or 
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions.  It does not 
admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a 
district.  It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy . . . . 
. . . . 
Article 56: A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public 
enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of 
any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, 
death, or any other barbarity. 
. . . . 
Article 76: Prisoners of war shall be fed upon plain and wholesome food, 
whenever practicable, and treated with humanity. 
Francis Lieber, General Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY 
HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 48, 56, 59 (1983). 
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was whether the confession was reliable.27 Too often, forcibly extracted 
confessions were given by the suspects solely to stop the interrogation.28  This 
focus on reliability dominated American confession law well into the 
twentieth century.29   
In the 1944 case Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court discussed 
interrogation methods known as the “third degree.”30  These techniques 
were used to obtain confessions without brutal force, but with things like 
powerful lights, persistent questioning over numerous hours, and deprivation 
of sleep.31  The Court held that where the manner of interrogation was 
inherently coercive, the confession would be inadmissible regardless of 
reliability.32  Moreover, if impermissible methods were used, a confession 
would be inadmissible regardless of the impact that those methods had 
or did not have on that particular defendant.33
 27. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 294.  The history of this approach extends 
back to ancient Rome.  “Torture had been common to the late Roman Empire.  Its 
legitimacy was denied by Christendom, and it was slowly abolished . . . .”  ROUSAS JOHN 
RUSHDOONY, THE INTENT OF THE LAW 120 (1999).  See also Ross, supra note 22, at 6 
(“Instead of questioning the method, the [Romans] surrounded it with a jurisprudence 
that was designed to give greater assurance to its reliability, a jurisprudence that is 
admirable in its scepticism and unsettling in its logic.” (quoting EDWARD PETERS, 
TORTURE 35 (expanded ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 1996) (1985))). 
 28. Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears trustworthy, because a sort  
of compulsion is attached to it. . . .  [Actually, however, t]hose under 
compulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true, some being ready to 
endure everything rather than tell the truth, while others are equally ready to 
make false charges against others, in the hope of being sooner released from 
torture.   
Ross, supra note 22, at 5 (quoting ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC §§ 1376b–1377a (W. Rhys 
Roberts trans., 1954) (350 B.C.E.)).  The actual number of false confessions is unknown 
and probably unknowable.  It is certainly subject to debate.  Compare Paul G. Cassell, 
The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful 
Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 529 (1999) (“false 
confessions occur quite infrequently”), with Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The 
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice 
in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) 
(arguing that confessions are much more common). 
 29. See Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 
VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979).  Military commissions still look to see whether information 
is relevant and reliable in order to decide issues of admissibility.  YOO, supra note 8, at 
218–19. 
 30. 322 U.S. 143, 150 n.5 (1944). 
 31. Id. at 150 n.6.  The Court found Ashcraft’s confession involuntary, compelled, 
and thus inadmissible.  Id. at 153.  This conclusion was based on Ashcraft’s continual 
relay-style interrogation over a period of thirty-six hours without rest.  Id. 
 32. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949) (stating that if circumstances 
indicate that the confession was not given by the free will of the defendant, it will not be 
deemed voluntary and therefore will be inadmissible, even though the statements may be 
reliable). 
 33. The Court has noted, however, that the characteristics of a particular defendant 
might subject him or her to particular peril.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
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Of course, virtually all confessions are “involuntary” to some extent.34  
As one author put it: “[B]y any standards of human discourse, a criminal 
confession can never truly be called voluntary.  With rare exception, a 
confession is compelled, provoked, and manipulated from a suspect by a 
detective who has been trained in a genuinely deceitful art.”35  Critics 
also argued that the voluntariness test permitted too much pressure to be 
applied on suspects, as it only prohibited prosecutors from using evidence 
obtained by “interrogation methods that would exert so much pressure 
that the suspect would admit to facts regardless of whether she believed 
in the truth of the facts admitted.”36  Nevertheless, the voluntariness rule 
still exists, though it is often overshadowed by Miranda.37 
In the 1950s, the Supreme Court established the so-called McNabb-
Mallory rule.38  Based on a federal statute39 and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure,40 this rule held that a criminal defendant had to be 
arraigned without unnecessary delay and that any confession obtained 
during such a delay could be excluded from evidence in any subsequent 
165 (1986) (“[M]ental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to 
police coercion . . . .”). 
 34. “Although confession may be good for the soul, it is lousy for the defense.  
Thus, in a typical case, to obtain statements from unwilling suspects, officers themselves 
must employ some form of deception.”  Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 109, 154 (1984) (footnote omitted).  See also PETER BROOKS, 
TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE 8–64 (2000) 
(discussing some of the deep-seated psychological and cultural reasons why suspects 
choose to speak to the police and confess); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really 
Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1828–
29 (1987) (discussing a suspect’s “almost irresistible impulse to respond to . . . accusations”); 
Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the Mentally 
Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243, 254–55 (2004) (listing reasons why suspects feel 
compelled to confess). 
 35. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 199 (1991). 
 36. Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 2001, 2011–12 (1998). 
 37. In Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, a man heard voices that commanded him to do 
things.  One of those things was to make a confession.  Id. at 174–75 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  Lower courts, based on testimony from psychologists, concluded that this 
was not voluntary and therefore was inadmissible.  Id. at 162 (majority opinion).  The 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that before a confession could be deemed involuntary, 
there must be “coercive police activity.”  Since there was none here, it was not 
involuntary.  Id. at 166–67. 
 38. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 
354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 5). 
 40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
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prosecution.  The rule was never constitutionally required, and it was 
eventually supplanted by Miranda.41
In the 1960s, the Warren Court dramatically reshaped the way society 
dealt with criminals and criminal suspects.42  Prior to that time, protections 
afforded defendants in state criminal proceedings, where most criminal 
cases are tried, were often limited.  The Bill of Rights applied only to the 
federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which did apply to the 
states, gave criminal defendants only those fundamental rights deemed 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.43  In the 1960s, the Supreme Court 
began to read the Fourteenth Amendment in a new manner.  Instead of 
looking for fundamental rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, 
it moved to “selective incorporation” of provisions contained in the Bill 
of Rights.44  By moving to this approach, the Supreme Court led a revolution 
in American criminal procedure and provided all of the following rights 
to state criminal defendants: the freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures and the exclusionary rule;45 the prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment;46 the right to assistance of counsel in felony 
cases;47 the privilege against self-incrimination;48 the right to confront 
opposing witnesses;49 the right to a speedy trial;50 the right to compel 
defense witnesses to appear at trial;51 the right to a jury trial;52 and protection 
against double jeopardy.53  In 1972, the death penalty was declared 
 41. The Miranda opinion briefly notes both the history of the “third degree” in 
America and the danger of false confessions.  It described the modern interrogation 
process as “psychologically rather than physically oriented.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 447–48 (1966). 
 42. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the 
Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 
1363–64 (2004); BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION 
1960–1968 (1968); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-
Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995).  For recent articles reflecting on the 
criminal justice decisions of the Warren Court, see Symposium, The Warren Court 
Criminal Justice Revolution: Reflections a Generation Later, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1 
(2005).
 43. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
 44. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 45. Id. at 655. 
 46. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962). 
 47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963). 
 48. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 49. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407–08 (1965). 
 50. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967). 
 51. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967). 
 52. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968). 
 53. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–96 (1969). 
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unconstitutional as it was then applied,54 and in 1973, states were prohibited 
from outlawing abortions in the early stages of pregnancy.55
Regarding interrogations and confessions, the Supreme Court first 
adopted a rule based upon the Sixth Amendment.  Massiah v. United 
States prohibited the police from “deliberately eliciting” statements from 
an individual after the initiation of judicial proceedings—indictment, 
information, arraignment, or preliminary hearing—without an attorney 
being present.56  The following month, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court 
created the “focus” test, enforcing a right to counsel at the point when an 
investigation focuses on the accused with the purpose of eliciting a 
confession.57  A year later, the Court issued the now-familiar Miranda 
rules.58
Miranda’s demand that suspects be advised of their right to remain 
silent and their right to have an attorney present during questioning, 
combined with the exclusion of statements taken in violation of those 
rights, caused a shift in the landscape of criminal procedure.59  The 
voluntariness rule remained in place, as did Massiah’s prohibition on 
interfering with a suspect’s right to counsel.60  Miranda, however, required 
 54. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).  See generally 
Ronald J. Rychlak, Defense Counsel and the Death Penalty: An Obligation to Oppose 
the Theory Behind the Punishment?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 371 (2004). 
 55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).  See Ronald J. Rychlak, Abortion, 
Thinking Americans, and Judicial Politics, 14 U. FAC. FOR LIFE: LIFE & LEARNING CONF. 
PROC. 77 (2004), available at http://www.uffl.org/Vol14/rychlak-04.pdf. 
 56. 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
 57. 378 U.S. 478, 491–92 (1964). 
 58. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in- 
custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will 
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so 
freely.  In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to 
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately 
and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be 
fully honored. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
 59. See Roxane J. Perruso, And Then There Were Three: Colorado’s New Death 
Penalty Sentencing Statute, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 189, 190 (1997) (explaining that within 
two years of Furman, twenty-nine states had enacted new death penalty statutes). 
 60. The Massiah test remains viable, but Escobedo does not.  See Minnesota v. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 
(1976).  Thus, the government can deliberately elicit information after a suspect has 
become the focus of the investigation, but prior to the start of formal proceedings.  In 
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 163–68 (1985), for instance, police secretly recorded 
meetings between the defendant and his codefendant, who was cooperating with the 
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that police inform suspects about their legal rights.  The practical effect 
of Miranda was that suspects who had confessed to crimes were 
occasionally set free.61  For that reason, it was a very controversial 
decision.62   
III.  SELF-INCRIMINATION IN THE TERRORISM CONTEXT 
Even if some interrogators are able to use Miranda to help them obtain 
statements, the rules are certainly designed to help suspects invoke their 
right not to incriminate themselves.63  If those rules are serving their 
intended purpose, they are making life harder for interrogators and 
prosecutors.  Logically, then, they would have the same impact on those 
trying to gain information to assist with the war on terror.  The question 
is whether the same concerns that justify protection against self-
incrimination in domestic criminal cases are applicable when it comes to 
the war on international terrorism.  The two primary concerns are: false 
testimony elicited during interrogation, and the related issue of brutal 
police.  The conversations related to crimes that had already been charged and other 
crimes where there were no charges.  The Court held that conversations relating to 
pending charges had to be excluded, but conversations relating to other criminal activity 
did not have to be excluded.  Id. at 180.  Similarly, in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 
171, 175–76 (1991), the Court found statements were admissible where they related only 
to criminal activity not yet charged and were gained from a person in custody who had 
invoked his right to an attorney. 
 61. Within two years of the Miranda decision, Congress tried to change the legal 
landscape.  Taking heed of Justice John Harlan’s dissenting opinion that the “social costs 
of crime are too great to call the new [Miranda] rules anything but a hazardous 
experimentation,”  384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting), Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 
3501, which said: “In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the 
District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be 
admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given . . . .”  Congress left no doubt that the 
purpose of § 3501 was to reverse the holding in Miranda.  The statute provided that, 
when the trial court is deciding whether a confession is voluntary, it should take into 
account all circumstances surrounding the confession, including whether Miranda-type 
warnings were given.  18 U.S.C. § 3501(b)(3) (1968).  The absence of such warnings, 
however, would not preclude admissibility of an otherwise voluntary confession.  Id. 
§ 3501(b)(5).  This section was ruled unconstitutional in United States v. Dickerson, 530 
U.S. 428, 442–44 (2000). 
 62. The dynamics of this period of activity for the Supreme Court must be placed 
into context.  The state criminal laws had been established by the political process.  In 
other words, the situation as it was before these cases reflected the will of the majority of 
persons living in any given state.  To much of the public, the Warren Court reforms 
meant that criminals were being set free by the courts, even when guilt was not in 
question.  Since most of these issues were held to be required by the Constitution, 
however, state political action could not change the law.  As to the death penalty, 
however, the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision left open the possibility of applying it in a 
constitutional manner.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310–11 (1972) (White, J., 
concurring).  By 1974, twenty-nine states had acted to restore the death penalty.  Perruso, 
supra note 59, at 190. 
 63. SIMON, supra note 35, at 197–98. 
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tactics being used by police authorities in order to elicit incriminating 
statements.64   
A.  Concern about False Confessions and Bad Information 
If suspects are forced to speak, investigators might get false 
confessions or other bad information.65  Consider the case of Brown v. 
Mississippi, in which the defendant’s conviction was based solely on a 
confession induced by beatings.66  He had been hanged twice by the 
local deputy and other men—the marks on neck were still visible at 
trial—then whipped.67  When he would not confess, he was released 
only to be picked up two days later, whipped again, and told that the 
whippings would continue until he confessed and agreed in every detail 
that the deputy suggested.68  The defendant’s story, in fact, changed 
several times to fit the facts as they were explained to him.69  The 
confession was admitted at trial, and the jury convicted and sentenced 
him to death.70  The U.S. Supreme Court held that this violated the 
 64. As early as 866, Pope St. Nicholas I wrote: 
If a [putative] thief or bandit is apprehended and denies the charges against 
him, you tell me your custom is for a judge to beat him with blows to the head 
and tear the sides of his body with other sharp iron goads until he confesses the 
truth.  Such a procedure is totally unacceptable under both divine and human 
law, since a confession should be spontaneous and not forced.  It should be 
proffered voluntarily, not violently extorted.  After all, if it should happen that 
even after inflicting all these torments, you still fail to wrest from the sufferer 
any self-incrimination regarding the crime of which he is accused, will you not 
then at least blush for shame and acknowledge how impious is your judicial 
procedure?  Likewise, suppose an accused man is unable to endure such 
torments and so confesses to a crime he never committed.  Upon whom, pray 
tell, will now devolve the full brunt of responsibility for such an enormity, if 
not upon him who coerced the accused into confessing such lies about himself? 
Letter from Pope St. Nicholas I to Boris, Bulgarian Prince (866), reprinted in Brian W. 
Harrison, The Church and Torture, THIS ROCK, Dec. 2006, at 23, 27. 
 65. See, e.g., PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: 
WINNING WITHOUT WAR 109–11 (2003); Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and 
“Postcommitment”: The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
2013, 2028–29 (2003); Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the 
Innocent Have Confessed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al; Thomas H. Maugh II, 
Glendale Case Raises Issue of Reliability of Confessions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at 
Al. 
 66. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 67. Id. at 281. 
 68. Id. at 282. 
 69. Id. at 282. 
 70. Id. at 279. 
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Fourteenth Amendment.71  In fact, it called the Mississippi Supreme 
Court decision upholding the conviction a denial of due process in and 
of itself.72
As illustrated in the Brown case, and totally aside from the related 
concern for the just treatment of citizens, unrestrained interrogation may 
lead to bad information that adequately serves neither the purpose of 
criminal justice, nor the nation’s fight against terrorism.73  Moreover, not 
only physical abuse elicits false confessions and bad information.  
Mental duress can also lead to false confessions. 
The case of William N. Oatis is an interesting example of mental 
pressure leading to a false confession.74  In 1951, Oatis, an American 
citizen, was taken into Czech custody on charges of espionage while 
working as bureau chief for the Associated Press in Prague.75  He was 
innocent, but he signed a false confession after being interrogated for six 
days.76  Oatis described how he felt after having been kept awake for 
over forty-two straight hours in an article for Life magazine: 
The room was whirling.  I could not seem to make my eyes—or my brain—
focus.  I wanted time to think.  I knew that this was a great and perhaps fatal 
step: if I signed, I would be confessing to something I had not done.  I wanted to 
consider what I might be doing to myself by signing this document—and what I 
might be doing by refusing to sign it.  But there was something else I wanted 
more.  That was sleep.  I had been awake 42 hours.  Through that time, almost 
without letup, I had been questioned, browbeaten, and berated.  I was limp with 
fatigue.  My eyes kept falling shut, my mind kept blanking out.  My future 
might lie in the balance, but the future must take care of itself.  Tomorrow was 
another day.  Tonight was what bore me down.  I must end it somehow.  There 
seemed only one way to do that, and that was to sign the confession.  So I 
signed it.  The 42 hours had finished me.  I had gone to embassy people for help 
in my unofficial reporting, a procedure followed by journalists everywhere, but 
now I had confessed the opposite.  I had signed a paper saying I went to the 
embassy to deliver information rather than to obtain it.  I had not chosen to 
abandon the truth—the choice had been made for me . . . .77 
 71. Id. at 287. 
 72. Id. at 285–86. 
 73. Nat Hentoff, Prisons of Darkness: CIA Leads U.S. in ‘Reaching for the Low 
Moral Ground’ in the War Against Terrorism, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 2, 2005, at 26, 
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0549,hentoff,70638,6.html. 
 74. Rayner Pike, AP Reporter William Oatis Dies, Sept. 16, 1997, http://www. 
oatis.com/memorial/obit.html (“On the first day I admitted that I had done unofficial 
reporting, which I had; within three days I confessed that this was espionage, which—by 
any Western standard—it was not; and within seven days I confessed that I had spied for 
the U.S. government—which was a lie.”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Human Rights Watch, Descriptions of Techniques Allegedly Authorized by 
the CIA, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/21/usdom12071.htm [hereinafter Human 
Rights Watch, Descriptions] (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); Human Rights Watch, CIA 
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Obviously, false confessions are a concern for police or other intelligence- 
gathering authorities.78  The right not to incriminate oneself helps protect 
against the danger of possible misinformation.79
False confessions obtained in criminal cases have often been driven by 
animus based on factors such as race, politics, the desire of police 
authorities to “close” a case, or other personal interests.80  Such factors could 
impact a terror-related interrogation, but the risk is significantly lower, 
in part because investigators in one context would necessarily possess 
different goals than investigators in the other.  In regular criminal 
investigations, the goal is to obtain a conviction of the suspect.  Thus, 
the statement is valuable to the prosecution regardless of whether it is 
accurate. 
Interrogators in the terrorism context, however, are seeking information, 
not trying to get a conviction.  They seem to think that pressure—physical 
or nonphysical—is more beneficial than not, and they are in the best 
position to evaluate the risk of bad information from aggressive interrogation.  
Interrogators know the risks of false confessions, and yet, in every 
society, they continually return to forceful methods of interrogation.81  
Those outside of the terrorism investigation community are not close 
enough to the action to successfully prove that the risk of false confessions 
is sufficiently serious so as to justify providing terrorist suspects with the 
right not to incriminate themselves.82  Accordingly, and without meaning 
to condone overly aggressive interrogation, much less torture, this “potentially 
Whitewashing Torture: Statements by Goss Contradict U.S. Law and Practice, http://hrw.org/ 
english/docs/2005/11/21/usdom12069.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007). 
 78. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 28, at 429. 
 79. See also Ross, supra note 22, at 5. 
 80. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting 
the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 131–32 (2006) (exploring the impact of race 
on interrogation). 
 81. Levinson, supra note 65, at 2030.  “The sad fact is that, for much of history, 
actual torture was a regular part of the judicial processes of virtually every human 
society—and not because it was ineffective.  This debate should be framed in terms of 
policy and morality, not on false claims of futility.”  Rivkin & Casey, supra note 12, at 
A11.  See also infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text (forceful techniques more 
necessary in terror-related cases). 
 82. Compare Cassell, supra note 28, at 527–29, with Richard A. Leo & Richard J. 
Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 558 (1998) (“Not only is Cassell’s thesis that ‘Miranda 
affirmatively harms the innocent’ unsupported by any evidence, it also flies in the face of 
reason.”). 
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bad information” argument is an insufficient justification for the right not 
to incriminate oneself, at least in a terrorism-related situation.83  The 
argument certainly does not justify the Miranda rule being applied in 
such a context. 
B.  The “Slippery Slope” Argument 
Another argument in support of the right not to incriminate oneself is 
that without such a right, police officers might be tempted to coerce 
suspects into making statements, perhaps sliding into overly aggressive 
interrogation or even torture.84  The concern here is that “if torture is 
condoned in the extreme case of the known terrorist who has certainly 
planted the ticking time-bomb, security officers will come to believe that 
they hear bombs ticking everywhere, and will use torture against people 
merely suspected of posing a security threat.”85
This may be a particularly serious threat in the terrorism context.86  
When it comes to routine criminal investigations, many authorities have 
concluded that harsh practices associated with “the third degree” are less 
effective in obtaining truthful statements than psychologically oriented 
 83. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, Moral Prohibition at a Price, in TORTURE, supra 
note 22, at 18, 25–26.  See also supra note 81 (quoting Rivkin & Casey, supra note 12, 
at A11).   
 84. See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 
(1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 
(2003). 
 85. Michael C. Dorf, Renouncing Torture, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 
247, 250 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006) (“Only by prohibiting torture under all 
circumstances, such laws assume, can we prevent an extremely limited authorization, for 
torture in extreme circumstances, from becoming a license for routine torture.”).  See 
also Krauthammer, supra note 9. 
 86. Of course, the first question is to reach a consensus on the meaning of 
“torture.”  The practice lacks a clear definition in international agreements and in 
American law.  See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 279–81 & n.9.  As Richard Posner, U.S. 
Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago 
Law School, has noted: “Almost all official interrogation is coercive, yet not all coercive 
interrogation would be called ‘torture’ by any competent user of the English language, so 
that what is involved in using the word is picking out the point along a continuum at 
which the observer’s queasiness turns to revulsion.”  Richard Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and 
Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 291, 291 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).  In 
other words, there is a continuum of pressure that can be applied during interrogation, 
ranging from an uncomfortable chair and warm lights to extreme physical abuse, and 
perhaps even worse.  Moreover, there are at least four different reasons why torture 
might be used: as punishment, for the enjoyment of the person inflicting the torture, to 
extract a confession of criminal activity, and to obtain information so as to prevent 
greater harm—the “ticking bomb” scenario.  According to Father Brian Harrison, O.S., a 
professor at the Pontifical University of Puerto Rico, the Catholic Church has 
condemned the first three reasons for inflicting torture, but—perhaps tellingly—has not 
expressly condemned torture in the fourth situation.  Harrison, supra note 64, at 27.  See 
also Krauthammer, supra note 9 (arguing along similar lines). 
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techniques designed to reduce the suspect’s resistance in typical criminal 
investigation.87  In terror-related situations, however, the evidence suggests 
that more civil interrogation tactics are not as successful.88  Consider: 
As Posner and others have tartly pointed out, if torture and coercion were both 
as useless as critics pretend, why is there so much of it going on?  While some 
abuse and outright torture can be attributed to the sadism of individuals, poor 
supervision, and so on, it must be the case that other acts of torture occur 
because interrogators believe, in good faith, that torture is the only way to 
extract information in a timely fashion.  It must also be the case that if experienced 
interrogators come to this conclusion, they do so on the basis of their experience.  
The argument that torture and coercion do not work is contradicted by the dire 
frequency with which both practices occur.89
Indeed, the events of September 11, 2001, have caused serious scholars to 
debate the previously unthinkable prospect of legalized torture.90
The Supreme Court has defended the Fifth Amendment right to not 
incriminate oneself as a solution to the “cruel trilemma” of self-incrimination, 
perjury, or contempt that faces a defendant who is required to offer 
testimony in his or her own case.91  At a fundamental level, this is a moral 
decision, rather than a pragmatic one.92  It does not follow, however, that 
 87. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 28, at 434 n.10 (“Interrogators may have become 
more effective at obtaining confession statements than they were in the prior era of third 
degree interrogation.”). 
 88. YOO, supra note 8, at 189. 
 89. Ignatieff, supra note 83, at 25–26. 
 90. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002) (suggesting the creation of a warrant 
for torture); Posner, supra note 86; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: 
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); Anthony Lewis, 
Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004; Dershowitz: Torture Could Be 
Justified, CNN.COM/LAW CENTER, Mar. 4, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/03/ 
cnna.Dershowitz/ (Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz discussing the possibility). 
Human Rights Watch put together a list of forms of torture that the CIA allegedly has 
authorized.  Human Rights Watch, Descriptions, supra note 77. 
 91. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).  In fact, it is not clear 
that the trilemma is as cruel as some would make it.  As Justice Scalia has argued, “This 
‘trilemma’ is wholly of the guilty suspect’s own making, of course.  An innocent person 
will not find himself in a similar quandary (as one commentator has put it, the innocent 
person lacks even a ‘lemma’ . . .).”  Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998) 
(quoting Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, 
and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1016 (1996)). 
 92. There are those who argue that the law should not impose moral values.  
Without delving into that argument in other contexts, it is certainly legitimate for a 
society to decide that authorities who are acting on behalf of the public should behave in 
a moral manner.  See generally Rychlak, supra note 55. 
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moral concerns would justify the same rules in a terror-related 
scenario.93
Counterterrorism is different from regular law enforcement in ways 
that may make some form of aggressive interrogation justifiable, if not 
necessary.  Normal law enforcement is “designed to punish and deter, 
rather than prevent, criminal conduct.”94  The goal of counterterrorism units, 
in contrast, is to “discover and pre-empt future suicide attacks before 
they take place.”95  At the same time, few, if any, citizens want to give 
interrogators full discretion to do whatever they wish.96  Elimination of 
all rules and the threat of sanctions for the interrogators would open the 
possibility of widespread abuse. 
   The Christian view of human nature and sin suggests that we are fallible 
creatures and thus not good at empire.  We cannot be trusted with domination, 
becoming too easily corrupted by its power and too often succumbing to 
repression in defending it.  Therefore, we should not simply be shocked at the 
evil we have seen in the horrible prison photos, but also sobered and saddened 
by that same potential in ourselves.97
 93. See National Council of Churches USA & Church World Service General 
Assembly, A Statement on the Disavowal of Torture, Nov. 2005, http://www.ncccusa.org/ 
about/policies.html (“Torture, regardless of circumstance, humiliates and debases 
torturer and tortured alike.”).  The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides: 
Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish 
the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the 
person and for human dignity.  Except when performed for strictly therapeutic 
medical reasons, directly intended amputations, mutilations, and sterilizations 
performed on innocent persons are against the moral law. 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH para. 2297, at 553 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana 
trans., 2d ed. 2000).  The Catechism goes on to state: 
In times past, cruel practices were commonly used by legitimate governments 
to maintain law and order . . . .  In recent times it has become evident that these 
cruel practices were neither necessary for public order, nor in conformity with 
the legitimate rights of the human person.  On the contrary, these practices led 
to ones even more degrading. It is necessary to work for their abolition.  We 
must pray for the victims and their tormentors. 
Id. para. 2298, at 553. 
 94. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Claims and Counterclaims, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 5, 2006, at A20. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Even when in extremis situations may occur, one would expect that, in those  
cases, governments would not seek to rationalize these actions or justify them, 
but, in following Henry David Thoreau, acknowledge such abhorrent individual 
practices when done to avoid a greater imminent and certain harm, and submit 
those who engage in them to the legal consequences for their violations. 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Great Nations and Torture, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA, 
supra note 85, at 256, 259. 
 97. Jim Wallis, The Theology of Torture, SOJOURNERS MAG., Aug. 2004, at 5, 5. 
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Waterboarding has already been publicly defended.98  What about 
beatings, amputations, or inflicting pain on members of the suspect’s 
family?  Obviously, if the controls are completely lifted, it is easy to 
imagine interrogators going too far.99  As one commentator has noted, “It 
is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into a 
poor devil’s eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.”100  
Therefore, the “slippery slope” argument for the right not to incriminate 
oneself does apply to the terrorism scenario.  Some controls must be 
kept in place in these situations. 
IV.  CONTROLS ON TERROR-RELATED INTERROGATIONS 
Even though there is some reason to place restrictions on interrogation, 
even in the terrorism scenario, Miranda-style protections are not 
 98. On September 20, 2006, television host Bill O’Reilly had Brian Ross of ABC 
News on his show.  Ross had just done research into aggressive interrogation.  He found 
that fourteen detainees with very important information about future terror plots broke 
down and talked after being subjected to waterboarding.  He reported that the toughest 
suspect broke down in two and a half minutes but that most only lasted for thirty seconds.  
Ross admitted that it probably could kill someone, but the key aspect of waterboarding is 
that it makes the subject feel like he is drowning, triggering an uncontrollable gag reflex.  
See Harrison, supra note 64, at 24.  For a report critical of O’Reilly’s take on this 
issue, see Bill O’Reilly Endorses Waterboarding as Safe and Reliable, NEWS 
HOUNDS, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.newshounds.us/2006/09/20/ bill_oreilly_endorses_water 
boarding_as_safe_and_reliable.php. 
 99. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Krauthammer, supra note 9. 
 100. Ross, supra note 22, at 16 (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442 n.1 (1883)).  Consider also: 
   Unlike a surgical procedure or a research methodology, torture is not easily 
susceptible to precision and restraint in application.  Its internal dynamic 
makes it prone to ever wider use.  Victims become inured to pain, inviting ever 
harsher and more imaginative measures, and no interrogator wants to “soften 
up” a subject just to have the next guy on the shift get the payoff when the 
prisoner cracks.  The very commission of brutality engages the emotions, impelling 
the torturer to resolve ambivalence toward seeing the victim as ever more 
deserving of harsh treatment, as we see in the taunts of female guards toward 
prisoners who urinated on themselves from fear of guard dogs.  Torture, like 
power, appears to be habit-forming.  The rationale of torture in an age of 
terror—averting imminent and massive harm to civilians by torturing the right 
source—easily slides to cover ever more remote sources and more hypothetical 
harms.  It is difficult to torture just a little. 
Dinah Pokempner, Command Responsibility for Torture, in TORTURE, supra note 22, at 
158, 167. 
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appropriate in such a context.101  As one Congressman said, “There’s not 
a single member of this Congress that believes that Miranda warnings 
should be given to terrorists.”102 
First, it is not even clear that Miranda has been successful in meeting 
its goal of protecting the right not to incriminate oneself in a general 
criminal context.  For instance, we know that there are some officers who 
would lie, denying brutal or coercive conduct that resulted in a statement 
from the suspect.  Those same officers are likely to testify falsely that 
they gave appropriate Miranda warnings.103  Even more problematic, a 
suspect who made an incriminating statement can claim that Miranda 
warnings were not given, raising a difficult issue of fact.  As Justice 
Douglas stated in a pre-Miranda case, the “trial on the issue of coercion 
is seldom helpful,” with police officers “usually testify[ing] one way, the 
accused another.”104  Miranda does little to change this problem.  It 
merely creates a fact question, and the prosecution has the burden of 
proof to show that the suspect understood his or her rights before 
waiving them. 
Miranda is, essentially, an exclusionary rule.  Statements taken in violation 
of Miranda cannot be used against the defendant in a subsequent 
prosecution, but if the suspect who was interrogated is not prosecuted, 
the exclusionary aspect of Miranda has no application.  Moreover, there 
are many exceptions that negate Miranda’s effect in specific cases.105  
 101. The criminal justice system is fundamentally reactive.  It can punish 
individual perpetrators, but it can prevent future crimes only through 
deterrence.  Deterrence, of course, works well enough on the domestic level, in 
a society where most individuals are law-abiding to begin with, and others fear 
the consequences of a criminal conviction.  It does not work at all where the 
bad actors, or at least a substantial number of them, are already willing to die 
in order to kill. 
Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., How to Treat a Captured Terrorist: Getting to the 
Heart of an Important Question, NAT’L REV., July 4, 2005, at 20, 20. 
 102. Anne Plummer Flaherty, Tribunals for Detainees Backed, DESERET MORNING 
NEWS (Salt Lake City), July 13, 2006, at A2 (quoting Rep. G.K. Butterfield (D-N.C.), a 
retired judge who served on North Carolina’s Supreme Court). 
 103. Moreover: 
[T]here is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Miranda has exacerbated the risks to the innocent.  The Miranda decision has 
reduced the number of truthful confessions, while at the same time doing 
nothing about, and probably even worsening, the false confession problem by 
diverting the focus of courts away from the substantive truth of confessions to 
procedural issues about how they were obtained. 
Cassell, supra note 28, at 526–27.  
 104. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the nature of the process gives defendants “little chance to prove coercion” 
at trial). 
 105. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (recognizing an 
exception for questioning prompted by concern for public safety); Harris v. New York, 
401 U. S. 222, 225 (1971); Bowen v. State, 607 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Miss. 1992) (holding 
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There is also a certain lack of logic in a rule that assumes that any 
statement taken prior to the receipt of warnings must be coerced, yet 
does not assume that waivers of the right to remain silent or to have an 
attorney present for questioning have similarly been coerced.106  Some 
commentators even believe that the police have learned to work with the 
Miranda rules so well that they have become nothing more than minor 
inconveniences, or perhaps even tools that the authorities can exploit in 
an interrogation.107
Miranda’s protections also come with a cost in terms of lost convictions.108  
Scholars have attempted to obtain empirical evidence regarding confessions 
and the impact of Miranda, but difficulty in gathering and evaluating the 
evidence has led to inconclusive results.109  Some commentators argue 
that Miranda’s costs, in terms of lost convictions, are too great to justify 
the benefits it supplies; they claim that “thousands of violent criminals 
that when a defendant is entitled to Miranda warnings and does not receive them, any 
voluntary statement made by him may be used for impeachment purposes). 
 106. As pointed out by Justice White: 
[I]f the defendant may not answer . . . a question such as “Where were you last 
night?” without having his answer be a compelled one, how can the Court ever 
accept his negative answer to the question of whether he wants to consult his 
retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint? 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). 
 107. Consider the following passage: 
Yet more than two decades after the landmark Escobedo and Miranda 
decisions, the rest of the world remains strangely willing to place itself at risk.  
As a result, the same law enforcement community that once regarded the 1966 
Miranda decision as a death blow to criminal investigation has now come to 
see the explanation of rights as a routine part of the process—simply a piece of 
station house furniture, if not a civilizing influence on police work itself. 
SIMON, supra note 35, at 199. 
 108. This, in and of itself, could be considered a moral violation of duty by the 
government.  Consider: 
The murderer, as the man guilty of the most extreme form of physical coercion, 
must without exception be put to death.  But, it must be noted, coercion against 
evildoers is the required and inescapable duty of the civil authority.  God 
requires coercion in the suppression of lawlessness.  Without godly coercion, 
the world is surrendered into the hands of ungodly coercion.  No man wants a 
hose of water turned against his living room, but, in case of fire, that water is a 
necessity and a welcome help.  Similarly, coercion is a God-ordained necessity 
to enable man to cope with outbreaks of lawlessness. 
ROUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, THE INSTITUTES OF BIBLICAL LAW 292 (3d prtg. 1976). 
 109. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 5, at 291.  See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s 
“Negligible” Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 327, 332 (1997).  As one British court noted, the right not to testify elicits 
“strong but unfocused” feelings.  R v. Dir. of Serious Fraud Office, [1993] A.C. 1, 26–33 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (Lord Mustill). 
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escape justice each year as a direct result of Miranda.”110  As one noted 
critic of Miranda has argued: 
   Evidence of Miranda’s harmful effects is mounting.  For example, along with 
various co-authors, I have developed empirical evidence of Miranda’s substantial harm 
to law enforcement.  In my most recent articles, I have analyzed the precipitous drop 
in crime clearance rates that followed immediately on the heels of Miranda and 
concluded that Miranda severely hampered police effectiveness.111
Others commentators argue that the cost of Miranda is minimal and the 
significant benefits include protection of the innocent and better control 
over the police.112
Whatever the cost may be in the criminal context, terrorism shifts the 
balance of the equation.  The risk of a single criminal going free is relatively 
small.  Large terror-related organizations are a different matter.  “[T]he 
harm any individual ordinary criminal can inflict, if wrongly freed, is 
limited.  The potential harm an al Qaeda operative can inflict is potentially 
enormous.”113  Criminal laws have long been written so as to recognize 
the additional danger associated with joint or group activity.  Similarly, 
the extraordinary danger posed by international terror organizations must 
be recognized by the law.114
In a criminal investigation, if police questioning is prompted by an 
immediate concern for public safety, the Supreme Court has held that the 
officers may question the suspect without first providing Miranda 
warnings.115  The suspect’s answers to these questions may be used not 
only to avert the immediate threat, but also as evidence in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution against the suspect.  That does not mean, of course, 
that any and all tactics are legitimate when an officer is motivated by 
public safety concerns.  Limits must still be set to protect suspects from 
overly aggressive interrogation.  Note, though, that the United States Supreme 
 110. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Paul G. 
Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing The Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on 
Miranda’s Harmful Effects On Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, (1998)), rev’d, 
530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 111. Cassell, supra note 28, at 531.  “The innocent are at risk not only from 
false confessions, but also from ‘lost’ confessions—that is, confessions that police fail 
to obtain from guilty criminals that might help innocent persons who would otherwise 
come under suspicion for committing a crime,” or become a victim of the criminals who 
did not confess.  Id. at 525. 
 112. See SUSAN M. EASTON, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 60–62 (1991) (arguing that the 
innocent are protected by the right to silence); Dennis, supra note 20, at 348 (describing 
protection of innocent against wrongful conviction as justification for privilege). 
 113. YOO, supra note 8, at 201. 
 114. See Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. 
Department of State, Terrorist Threats Against America, Testimony to the Committee on 
International Relations (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/ 2001/ 
5215.htm (discussing the extraordinary danger posed by international terror organizations). 
 115. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984). 
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Court has concluded that Miranda is not the appropriate instrument to 
protect those suspects.116
In a terrorism situation, every interrogation—at least every one that is 
hypothesized when discussing the ticking bomb scenario—can be said to 
be prompted by a concern for the public safety.  That does not, however, 
mean that every investigation tactic can be justified in the terrorism 
scenario.  If aggressive interrogations take place, innocent parties sometimes 
will be mistaken for legitimate suspects.  Likewise, aggressive techniques 
used to obtain information will not always be justified.  In those cases where 
aggressive techniques are used to obtain information, governmental officials 
should be subject to proceedings and possible punishment.117
Unlike Miranda, the approach being advanced here would require that 
the analysis and evaluation of the interrogation take place after the fact.118  
In a terrorism-related situation, it is not possible to develop in advance a 
one-size-fits-all template to determine what level of pressure can or 
should be applied to a given suspect and a particular threat.  Therefore, a 
post hoc inquiry is reasonable to assess the response to the nature of the 
threat, the complexity of the issues involved, and the variety of factual 
scenarios from one case to the next.  Various principles and limitations 
designed to protect detainees from overly abusive tactics, however, can 
and should be established.119  It can be assumed that over time, courts 
 116. Id. 
 117. Two issues that require further development include where responsibility 
should attach and whether low-ranking officials who are ordered to carry out aggressive 
interrogations should be able to invoke the “Nuremberg defense.”  See generally Frank 
Lawrence, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 397 (1989). 
German government officials, industrialists, and military leaders, whom the 
Allies accused of committing international crimes, presented the “original” 
Nuremberg Defense.  These defendants argued that they should not be held 
personally responsible for their actions because they were not top government 
officials, they had not formulated policy, they were following superior orders, 
and that international law did not apply to individuals. 
Id. at 413. 
 118. “Judges are good at focusing on what has happened in the past.  Whether an 
attack might occur in the future, its magnitude and how to stop it are beyond their usual 
expertise.”  YOO, supra note 8, at 201.  When it comes to terrorism, the same might be 
said of legislators and regulators. 
 119. A thorough examination of potential approaches is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  However, it is not difficult to imagine any number of possible approaches.  For 
example, Israeli law allows authorities to delay a suspect’s meeting with counsel for 
various increments of time, depending on the severity of the charges, the potential for 
future crime, and the severity of future crime.  This approach, of course, brings its own 
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and administrators will develop guidelines, limitations, and practices 
designed to protect suspects and detainees. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There are several risks associated with aggressive interrogation in 
criminal cases.  While the issues change in terrorism-related situations, 
there are still reasons to provide terror suspects some level of protection 
from abusive interrogation techniques.  The justifiable level of pressure 
to be applied in any given case cannot be decided with certainty in 
advance, but interrogators should not be given free reign.  That being 
said, Miranda is not the appropriate way to enforce those limitations in 
the terrorism scenario.  Rather, after-the-fact judicial or quasi-judicial 
investigations should look at all the facts and evaluate the actions of the 
interrogating authorities in light of what they knew at the time.120
After-the-fact judicial or quasi-judicial investigations give government 
authorities flexibility to deal with interrogation problems that are impossible 
to foresee but likely to develop.  This approach strikes a balance between 
the two competing needs—information to combat terrorism and just 
treatment of all detainees—and succeeds where Miranda fails because it 
holds interrogators responsible if they “cross the line,” but does not stop 
the flow of information.  This approach is not perfect; it will not stop all 
overly abusive tactics.  The same, of course, can be said of Miranda and 
almost every other device used to protect against abusive interrogation. 
In the war on terror, part of the battle is to thwart the enemy, and part 
of the battle is to maintain moral standards.  These goals will sometimes 
compete with each other.  It is therefore important to remember that military 
actions are fundamentally different from criminal investigations.  We can 
not expect criminal law doctrines to work appropriately in every military 
situation.  We must, however, maintain a basic level of morality in how 
we carry out government activities, including military operations.  This 
potential for abuse, as noted by at least one author.  Rinat Kitai, A Custodial Suspect’s 
Right to the Assistance of Counsel—The Ambivalence of Israeli Law Against the 
Background of American Law, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 205, 220–21, 233–34 (2004).  Some 
authors have argued that further exceptions to Miranda should be established.  See 
Darmer, supra note 15, at 351–53 (arguing that courts should carve out a “foreign 
interrogation” exception to Miranda, in the same manner that Quarles carved out a 
“public safety” exception).  Some merely argue that Miranda be suspended in terrorism 
investigations and that subsequent information gathered be barred from any use in trial or 
tribunal.  One is forced to wonder how that particular approach differs from Miranda’s 
normal function of excluding evidence obtained in violation of its requirements.  
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137, 2186–94 (2002). 
 120. In this manner, the standard and the investigation would be similar to the one 
undertaken to assess effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
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may be difficult, but it is necessary if we are to battle terrorism, maintain 
our integrity, and retain our national identity. 
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